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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of democracy at about 600 b.c., it has always been a key
question how the voting system affects the policies the candidates propose
[4]. How will the voting behavior change the candidates’ actions, and how
will the position of a candidate influence his number of votes? In later times,
more complex questions began to arise, namely what influences the number
of political parties or how the outcome of an election is determined by the
voter’s preferences among policies. As is usual in economics, we try to answer
these kinds of questions by forming a model.
A model that is the foundation of many theories of political problems ad-
dresses these questions: Hotelling’s Electoral Competition Game. In this
well-known game, two businesses A and B are situated along a street, both
a distance x away from both ends of the street. Buyers are uniformly dis-
tributed on this street, and each buyer incurs a cost of transportation which
is linear in the distance he has to travel to get the product [7]. Therefore,
as the two businesses ask the same price (in the original Hotelling game, the
firms not only chose positions but also prices; this is omitted here as we will
only look at the problem from a political point of view), a buyer will just go
to the nearest business to buy the product. The businesses can then choose
to simultaneously alter their positions. This results in the situation that the
best response for each business to the position of the other business is to
go as near as it can to the other firm’s position, as then it maximizes the
number of buyers the business attracts. This means that the firms are only
satisfied if they are back to back to each other.
This was an economic example for two firms, but Anthony Downs extended
the example to fit the context of an election with two parties or candidates
[3]. This famous model describes the behavior of these two candidates in a
simple majority voting situation, where the voters are uniformly distributed
with single-peaked preferences along a [0,1]-interval of possible positions for
the candidates. Then also the candidates have an incentive to be as close to
the position of the other candidate as possible, up to the point where both
of them are in the middle of the interval at exactly the same position. Once
they reach this position, they have no incentive to choose another one, as
they would get less than half of the votes then and lose the election.
Note that the voters need not be uniformly distributed in this model. If
they adopt any kind of distribution, the position both candidates want to be
in is naturally the median voter’s position; this is why another name for this
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theorem is the Median Voter Theorem [3].
This behavior by the candidates to adopt the median voter’s position has
first been analyzed by Duncan Black in his article ”On the Rationale of
Group Decision-making” [2], and a similar approach was considered even
earlier by the Marquis de Condorcet [8]. But the two works that basically
shaped all the subsequent research on electoral competition are the works by
Downs and Hotelling, and this famous median voter model is therefore also
called the Hotelling-Downs-Model.
Many variations of the model have been considered, described for exam-
ple by Osborne in a survey [10]. He finds that the result of the candidates
adopting similar positions is very robust if there are only two candidates,
even if the underlying structure is changed massively. The question remains
whether this idea survives the natural extension to elections with more than
two candidates, as well as variations of the underlying structure. One such
example would be a paper by Damien Neven, where he simulates sequential
entries of firms in a differentiated industry like Hotelling’s [9]. Yet, his work
does not allow for a choice whether to participate in the game or not.
In a model about electoral competition, it seems reasonable that it should be
possible for the potential candidates to choose not to run for office, as losing
the election is usually very costly. Furthermore, in reality, the candidates will
not choose their stances on the different policies simultaneously, but rather
sequentially.
It should be noted that a conjecture exists about the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium in the game with sequential entry of the candidates, an
arbitrary number of participants and an exit choice. A proof in this case has
not been found by the time of writing [12]. The conjecture is that this game
has a similar Nash-equilibrium to the Hotelling-Downs-Model, namely that
only the first and the last player will enter the game at the median voter’s po-
sition, so that they occupy the same position, and all other players will stay
out. This game would then be special in the sense that we know of games
where a first mover advantage or a last mover advantage exists, but not both.
Interestingly, this equilibrium would be consistent with the finding of Du-
verger’s Law: A plurality rule, that is, a single-winner voting system, will
lead to a two-party system [5]. Although Duverger’s law is mainly used to
explain parliament compositions like in the US now or in the United King-
dom from 1924 to 1974, where only two parties exist, it can also be used to
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explain, for example, the US-American presidential election. Such a presi-
dential election is very similar to this context, and the results also align in
such a way that rationally, only two candidates should run for office.
Alas, a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its
central prediction - convergence of platforms to the median voter’s ideal - is
seldom observed. One reason is that the classical model neglects the impor-
tance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes [1], as analyzed in a
paper by M. Bernhardt and D. Ingerman. The party or candidate who first
adopts a particular policy will be the one associated with this idea, and any
other candidate choosing the same position will be seen as imitating the first
candidate. In this sense, one can speak of an incumbent effect in politics.
This then clearly leads to the effect that candidates choose distinct policies
or positions.
To summarize, in our model we will assume that the candidates choose their
policies sequentially, there is an option not to take part in the election, as
running incurs a cost, and the candidates do not adopt exactly the same
opinions about all policies. Note that this last small but crucial assumption
- that no two candidates occupy the same position - changes the game signif-
icantly from the one Osborne’s Conjecture speaks about; the most striking
dissimilarity being that the Nash-equilibrium in the Conjecture is ruled out,
as two players occupy the same position. So, the unique Nash-equilibrium in
Osborne’s game and in the one we will be analyzing cannot be the same.
In the game we will be analyzing, the players are the candidates and their
strategy is a number, referred to as a position. We hereby make the ab-
straction that a policy can be abstracted into a number, thus making policy
choice one-dimensional. While this is a very simplifying assumption, it is not
without reason, as often political parties or candidates are categorized on a
left-right axis [11]. To simplify things even further, we make the standard
assumption that the population is uniformly distributed on the policy spec-
trum; assumptions about the distribution of the population on the policy
spectrum seem to have no implication on the outcome of the game, as long
as the distribution is nonatomic.
Also, we say that the candidates care only about winning, that is, about
not having a player that has more votes than them, and that they have no
restrictions to the choice of their position, ideological or otherwise, except
that they cannot adopt a position that a previous candidate already chose.
Then, as explained before, we find it reasonable to assume that the candi-
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dates enter sequentially and have an exit choice.
We then have a conjecture about the unique Nash-Equilibrium in this game,
namely that only the first player will enter the game at position 1
2
, the me-
dian voter’s position, and all other players will stay out. This game is then
characterized by a strong first-mover advantage.
In this thesis, we will first give a formal definition of the game in section
2, as well as introduce some notation and definitions in Section 3. Then,
we will prove some Lemmata in Section 4 that will be useful throughout the
thesis. In section 5, we will set up a conjecture about player 3’s strategy that
would prove the subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium in this game. We will
not be able to prove the conjecture in this thesis, but we are hopeful that in
the future a proof can be found. Moreover, if then the assumption about the
uniqueness of positions is dropped, Osborne’s Conjecture can be proven, too.
We are able to prove, however, parts of our conjecture. To do that, we first
derive some Lemmata specifically about the conjecture in section 6, putting
them together in section 7 in Theorem 1, one of the main findings in this
thesis; in short, it says that two inner intervals, that is intervals with players
on both edges, will not both be entered by players under specific assumptions.
The other main finding in this thesis is that player 2 will never enter in
a specific interval after player 1 has positioned himself in the middle of the
spectrum. To derive this Theorem in section 10, we will need Lemmas pro-
vided in sections 8 and 9.
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2 The Game
Each of the players 1, . . . , N chooses sequentially a member of the set [0, 1]∪
{NE}, but if a position has already been chosen by a predecessor, it cannot
be chosen by any other player. That is, each player either chooses a position
on the [0, 1]-interval that represents the spectrum of possible policies that
have not been chosen before, or plays ”No Entry”, that is, he opts out. The
choices are made sequentially starting with player 1, and every player is per-
fectly informed at all times.
The outcome of the game is then determined as follows: After all players
have chosen their actions, each player who has chosen a position receives
votes from a continuum of citizens, and the player who receives the most
votes wins. If there is a tie between different candidates, a candidate is cho-
sen at random from the candidates who have the most votes to win the game.
The distribution of citizens’ ideal points is uniform along the interval [0,1].
Each voter’s aversion against any position that is not his own is simply given
by the distance between his location and the other position. This means
that if a voter’s favorite position is x∗, he is indifferent between the positions
x∗− s and x∗ + s. This also means that the citizens do not vote strategically,
and voting is sincere.
Each player obtains the payoff 0 if he chooses {NE}, the payoff 1/j if he is
among the j players who receive the maximal fraction of votes, and −1 if
there exists a player who has more votes. That is, each player wants to enter
the competition if and only if he has some chance of winning, which in this
case means that he has a positive payoff. [12]
So, to summarize: In this game, the players are the candidates 1, . . . , N ;
the set of actions for each player is the set [0, 1]∪{NE}, and the payoffs are
0 if the player chooses {NE}, 1/j if the player is among the j players who
do not receive less votes than any other player, and −1 otherwise.
In this thesis, we will restrict ourselves to the analysis of subgame perfect
equilibria. Note that it is clear that in an equilibrium, a player can never get
a payoff of −1, as then he can simply choose to play NE and be better off.
From this follows that in an equilibrium, all entering players must get the
same number of votes.
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3 Notation and Definitions
3.1 Notation
We introduce the following notation:
xi . . . position of player i
d1, d2 . . . distances between players
v(xi) . . . number of votes player i receives for entering at position xi
Note that the number v(xi) is subject to change when more players enter.
To help with the visualization of the problem, we introduce a graphical rep-
resentation of the game:
j
0
j
4
5
j
1
3
1
j A Candidate’s Position
The fractions in the picture below the [0, 1]-spectrum denote the specific
positions of the players. So, in the example above, we have an interval where
one player occupies the left end of the interval, that is xa = 0, one player
position 1
3
, that is xb =
1
3
, and one player the position 4
5
, that is xc =
4
5
.
The votes these players get is calculated as follows: Player a gets no votes
from the left of him, and half of the distance to the player to the right of
him, so v(xa) = 0 +
1
3
2
= 1
6
. Player b gets half of the votes from the inter-
val to the left of him and half of the votes from the interval to the right of
him, that is v(xb) =
1
6
+
4
5
− 1
3
2
= 2
5
. Finally, player c gets half of the votes
from the interval to the left of them and all of the votes from the interval
to the right, as there is no player occupying any position xi >
4
5
. So he gets
v(xc) =
4
5
− 1
3
2
+ 1
5
= 13
30
. Note that the number of votes must add up to one,
so v(xa) + v(xb) + v(xc) = 1.
3.2 Definitions
Definition 1. We call a player ”winning” if he has a payoff strictly larger
than 0 at the end of the game, and we call a player ”losing” if he has a payoff
of −1.
Definition 2. We will speak of a ”voting equilibrium” if all players after the
ones already in the game can form an equilibrium in such a way that they
are winning.
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4 Lemmas and Notes about the Game
In this section, we will derive a number of Lemmas and make observations
that will be helpful throughout the thesis.
Lemma 1. If more than two players that want to form a voting equilib-
rium enter an interval with players on both edges, there can be at most two
different alternating distances between the players.
Proof. In a voting equilibrium, all players need to get the same number of
votes. For that to happen in an interval where there are players on both
edges, there can be at most two different alternating distances between the
players, d1 and d2. So, the distance between the left edge of the interval
and the first player on the left is d1, between the first and second player d2,
between the second and third player d1 again, and so on. This ensures that all
players get the same number of votes, as the number of votes the players get
is always v = d1+d2
2
. Clearly, with more different distances, that would not
be possible: If the number of votes player a gets is 2v(xa) = d1 + d2, and the
number of votes player b, who is player a’s neighbor, gets is 2v(xb) = d2 +d3,
their votes are the same only if d1 = d3.
Note 1. This implies that in a voting equilibrium situation, in an interval
with players on both edges, 2v = d1 + d2, where d1 and d2 are alternating
distances between the players in the interval.
Lemma 2. If more than two players wanting to form a voting equilibrium
enter in an interval with players on both edges, and the number of players
is odd, the votes they get is v = I
n+1
, where I is the interval length and n is
the number of players entering the interval.
Proof. We know from Note 1 that in this situation, v = d1+d2
2
. Now, the
interval length I can then be written as I = n+1
2
d1 +
n+1
2
d2, which simplifies
to v = I
n+1
.
Note 2. This also implies that d1 and d2 can be written as functions of n if
n is odd: d1(n) = I − nv and d2 = (n+ 2)v − I.
Lemma 3. If more than two players wanting to form a voting equilibrium
enter in an interval with players on both edges, and the number of players is
even, the votes they get is v = I−d1
n
, where I is the interval length, d1 is a
distance, and n is the number of players entering the interval.
Proof. We know from Note 1 that in this situation, v = d1+d2
2
. Now, the
interval length I can then be written as I = (n
2
+ 1)d1 +
n
2
d2, which simplifies
to v = I−d1
n
.
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Lemma 4. It is not possible that an even number of players who want to
form a voting equilibrium enter an interval with players on both edges, and
both of these edge players are not part of the voting equilibrium.
Proof. First note that if an edge player is not part of the voting equilibrium,
he gets strictly less votes than the players forming the equilibrium.
Let us call the edge players players l and r. In this equilibrium we then have
two distances d1 and d2, separating the players alternatingly, and 2v = d1+d2.
As the number of players is even, the first player (player 1) entering the
interval must have an interval to the left or to the right of him where an odd
number of players enter; we will assume w.l.o.g. it is the right one. If that is
the case, the players entering in the right interval always have a possibility
to make this player lose without influencing the other parts of the game. For
that to happen, the number of votes they get must stay the same, but the
number of votes player 1 gets must be reduced. We see that this is always
possible by looking at the interval in question: From x1 to a there is the
distance a− x1 = s(d1 + d2), where s = n+12 . The players can now find new
d˜1 and d˜2 such that d1 + d2 = d˜1 + d˜2, and d˜1 > d1 and d˜2 > d2, thereby
making player 1 lose votes and player r gain votes.
Basically, this means that the first player has no position to enter, as in
an interval with an odd number of players the players can shift votes from
one end of the interval to the other without changing their own votes. Note
the important fact that this deviation does not influence the other players in
the game, as the players who deviate do not change their number of votes,
and they give votes to a player who already has less votes than them.
Lemma 5. If two players enter in an interval with players on both edges
and they want to form a voting equilibrium, they can position themselves in
such a way that the infemum of their votes is a quarter of the available votes
and the supremum is half of the available votes.
Proof. To see this, consider an interval [y, z] with length I and two players
a, b entering who want to form a voting equilibrium, that is they want to get
the same number of votes, and more than the edge players. To get the same
number of votes they need that y + d1 = xa and z − d1 = xb. If d1 → I2 , we
have that xa = xb and v(xi) → I4 . As d1 approaches 0, the fraction of votes
the players get gets larger and larger, but they can not adopt positions xy or
xz. We see that v(xi)→ I2 as d1 → 0.
Note 3. We will assume that player 1 always enters at x1 =
1
2
. The reason
is that if no other player enters after him, then player 1 clearly cannot do
better.
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Note 4. The game is symmetric at 1
2
.
This simply means that if we consider any configuration of positions of
players and give any statement concerning that particular configuration, we
can reflect the game vertically along the point 1
2
, and we get another config-
uration for which the same statement holds true.
Later we will often encounter the case that in an interval with one player
on the edge (let us call it a side interval), players want to enter and form a
voting equilibrium. To see if they can form a voting equilibrium, we consider
the following Lemma.
Lemma 6. In an interval with one player on the edge and no player on the
other, if players want to form a voting equilibrium, this is only possible if
∃y ∈ N : y = F
d1+d2
for F = 2+d2−2v−2p, where d1 and d2 are the distances
between the players, p is the position of the edge player, and v is the number
of votes the players forming the voting equilibrium get.
Proof. In an interval with one player on the edge at position p, with no player
on the right hand side of the interval w.l.o.g., N players enter and form a
voting equilibrium. Then, for all players to get the same number of votes, we
need that the N players form a sequence x1, x2, . . . , xN where the position of
player xn is given by
xn = p+
n∑
i=1
i odd
d1 +
n∑
i=2
i even
d2, (1)
where p ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed position, and d1 and d2 are distances.
We need p, and two out of the three following variables d1, d2, and the
number of votes v the players in the side interval will get, to define this
sequence. Note that d1 and d2 determine v, or v and one of the distances
determines the other distance. Furthermore, this setup fixes the number N
of players entering the interval.
While for the players x1, . . . ,N−1 the number of votes equals v by construc-
tion, this need not be the case for xN . This is why we take a close look
at xN and show a way how to easily check whether the number of votes of
xN equals v or not. We assume we know d1, d2, v and p. Then we have to
analyze two cases: N is odd or N is even.
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N is even:
Player N , the one nearest to the edge, has the position
xN = p+
N
2
d1 +
N
2
d2. (2)
Player N − 1 has the position xN−1 = p + N2 d1 + (N2 − 1)d2, so the dis-
tance xN − xN−1 = d2. The number of votes player N gets is v(xN) =
1−xN + xN−xN−12 = 1−xN + d22 . We can rewrite this as xN = 1+ d22 −v. Now
we want to find a conflict in player N ’s position and the number of votes he
gets by inserting xN into (2). If we then rewrite this expression, we get that
N = 2+d2−2v−2p
d1+d2
.
N is odd:
Player N then has the position
xN = p+
N + 1
2
d1 +
N − 1
2
d2, (3)
and the distance xN − xN−1 = d1. The number of votes player N gets is
v(xN) = −1 − xN + d12 . We can rewrite this as xN = 1 + d12 − v. Now we
insert xN into (3) and get an expression for N , which is N =
2+d2−2v−2p
d1+d2
; we
see that the two expressions coincide no matter if N is even or odd.
We can then rewrite N = 2+d2−2v−2p
d1+d2
as N = y+ 2+d2−2v−2p−y(d1+d2)
d1+d2
for y ∈ N.
This equation is then fulfilled under the condition that ∃ y ∈ N : y = F
d1+d2
for F = 2 + d2 − 2v − 2p.
Lemma 7. If the actions x1 =
1
2
, x2 = NE, x3 = NE, . . . , xN = NE form a
Nash-equilibrium, it is unique.
Proof. To see that, simply consider the situation when x1 6= 12 ; then, at least
one player will enter for sure, because the last player can enter at xN =
1
2
and win alone if no other players entered before him. Therefore, there are
always at least two players entering the game if x1 6= 12 , so the maximum
payoff player 1 can get is 1
2
. In the above equilibrium, his payoff is 1, so he
will always be strictly better off in this equilibrium.
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5 Player 3’s Strategy: A Conjecture
In this section, we will give a conjecture about the unique subgame perfect
Nash-equilibrium in this game, and then express it in terms of a strategy of
player 3. The idea is to formulate a strategy for player 3 which, should player
2 enter the game, will always make player 2 lose and player 3 win, thereby
making player 2 play {NE}. This argument would then in itself prove that
the unique subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium for N players in this game is
one where only the first player enters at position 1
2
.
Conjecture 1. The unique subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium in this game
is x1 =
1
2
, x2 = NE, x3 = NE, . . . , xN = NE.
Note that we see very clearly the difference in Osborne’s model and ours
here, as the Conjecture about the unique Nash-equilibrium in the game is
not the same, as mentioned in the Introduction.
If we can define a strategy by player 3 which, no matter where player 2
enters after x1 =
1
2
has been played, will make player 2 lose and will make
player 3 win, and thereby player 2 would not want to have entered at all, then
this will ensure that Conjecture 1 holds (together with the observation that
the last player in the game, if only player 1 has entered so far, will always
get less votes than player 1 should he enter, and with Lemma 7).
To find such a strategy, it seems natural to start with a strategy in which
player 3 has more votes than players 1 and 2.
So, we have x1 =
1
2
, and w.l.o.g. x2 <
1
2
; player 3 then enters at a posi-
tion x3 >
1
2
.
Player 1’s votes are: v(x1) =
x3−x2
2
Player 2’s votes are: v(x2) =
x2
2
+ 1
4
Player 3’s votes are: v(x3) =
3
4
− x3
2
For player 3 to have more votes than player 1, the inequality v(x3) > v(x1)
has to hold. Inserting the corresponding values and solving for x3, we get
x3 <
3
4
+
x2
2
(4)
For player 3 to have more votes than player 2, the inequality v(x3) > v(x2)
has to hold. Inserting the corresponding values and solving for x3, we get
x3 < 1− x2 (5)
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We see that for x2 ≤ 16 equation (5) is the stronger condition and for x2 ≥ 16
equation (4). Therefore, we will try a strategy for a small and irrational
number ε > 0
x3 =
{
1− x2 − ε if x2 ≥ 16 ,
3
4
+ x2
2
− ε if x2 ≤ 16 .
But, as we are about to see, this strategy is not optimal for x2 ≤ 114 :
Lemma 8. If x1 =
1
2
and x2 ≤ 114 , player 3 will not play 34 + x22 − ε for any
ε > 0 and irrational.
Proof. As three players have entered, there are four intervals in the game.
We will call these intervals interval I-IV from left to right (so, interval II is
the interval (x2,
1
2
)). The number of votes to be gained by player 4 in each
interval is:
v(I) < x2
v(II) =
1
4
− x2
2
2v(III) = x3 − 1
2
=
1
4
+
x2
2
− ε
v(IV ) <
1
4
− x2
2
+ ε
We see that the maximum number of votes in interval IV is always big-
ger than the number of votes that can be gained in interval II. Note that
for the maximum number of votes that can be gained in each interval,
v(IV ) > v(II) > v(III) > v(I) holds. Note also that by the way x3 is
constructed, one player cannot find a position where he gets more votes than
players 1 to 3.
But, two players can always form a voting equilibrium in this game if x2 ≤ 114 :
The first player (a) entering after player 3 can enter in interval IV in such a
way that he gets exactly v(xa) =
1
4
− x2
2
, namely at xa =
3
4
+ x2
2
+ ε. Then
the next player (b) can enter in interval II and can only get the same number
of votes as player a. An entry in interval II is also the only way to match
player a’s number of votes, as in all the other intervals, only less votes can
be gained maximally.
Now all that remains to show is whether players a and b then have more
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votes than the other players in the game:
We know that
v(xa) = v(xb) =
1
4
− x2
2
(6)
v(x1) =
x3 − xb
2
(7)
v(x2) =
x2 + xb
2
(8)
v(x3) =
xa − 12
2
(9)
If there exists an interval which is a subset of interval II in which player b
can enter where he gets more votes than players 1 to 3, players a and b form
a voting equilibrium. For this, three inequalities have to hold:
v(xb) > v(x1) (10)
v(xb) > v(x2) (11)
v(x1) > v(x3) (12)
If we insert (7) and (9) into inequality (12) and solve for xb, we get the condi-
tion xb <
1
2
, which is always true. If we solve (10) for xb, we get the condition
xb >
1
4
+ 3x2
2
− ε. If we solve (11) for xb, we get the condition xb < 12 − 2x2.
In Figure 1, we see that for every value of x2 ≤ 114 , the interval length is
positive, represented by the vertical distance between the two functions. At
x2 =
1
14
, the two lines cross, but as the ε is positive, so is the interval length.
Therefore there exists a position for player b where players a and b form a
voting equilibrium if x2 ≤ 114 , thus making the strategy of player 3 not opti-
mal.
Note that the fact that two players form a voting equilibrium is enough
to state that this strategy by player 3 is not optimal. If the strategy was
optimal given players a and b enter the game, then player 3 would have to
get the same number of votes as player a by entry of other players. Given
that xa− x3 = 2ε, a large number of players would have to enter in intervals
II and III for players a and 3 to get the same number of votes, and to make
the entry of these players profitable. But this is not possible as we will see
by Theorem 1.
So, we alter the statement about player 3’s optimal strategy to our new
conjecture:
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Figure 1: Possible positions where player b can enter.
Conjecture 2. After x1 =
1
2
and x2 <
1
2
, there exists an irrational number
ε > 0 such that player 3 can play the strategy
x3 =

1− x2 − ε if x2 > 16 ,
3
4
+ x2
2
− ε if 1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 ,
3
4
+ x2
2
if x2 ≤ 114
to keep player 2 out of the game and win.
Lemma 9. Conjecture 1 follows from Conjecture 2.
Proof. If Conjecture 2 holds, this means that there exists a strategy that
keeps player 2 out of the game, so player 2 will play x2 = NE. Then, should
player n > 2 enter the game, player n+1 can always play the strategy defined
in Conjecture 2 and win alone. Therefore, no player up to player N will enter
the game. Then, as x1 =
1
2
, there exists no position for player N where he
can enter such that he does not get less votes than player 1, so he will also
play xN = NE, which is consistent with Conjecture 1.
Unfortunately, we will not be able to prove Conjecture 2 fully, but we
will be able to prove part of it, specifically that x2 will never play any action
in interval ( 1
14
, 1
4
). To do that, we will prove a number of new Lemmata
concerning entry in the two intervals {(x2, 12) and (12 , x3)} in the next chapter.
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6 Lemmata about the Conjecture
In this section, we will present Lemmas for the specific setup of Conjecture
2; they will be needed to prove Theorem 1 and 2, the main findings of this
thesis.
6.1 General Lemmata
The following is assumed for all Lemmas of section 6.1: x1 =
1
2
, x2 <
1
2
and
x3 = f(x2) − ε, where f is a linear function and ε is irrational such that if
x2 is rational, x3 is irrational and vice versa.
Lemma 10. If there is entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
) and (1
2
, x3), at least
one of the players 1-3 must be part of the voting equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 2, if the number of n players entering an interval with
players on both edges is odd, the number of votes they get is v = I
n+1
, where
I is the interval length. As one of the intervals has rational length and the
other one irrational length, the case where both intervals are entered by an
odd number of players is ruled out.
Then, by Lemma 4, if an even number of players enters an interval with
players on both edges, at least one of the edge players must be part of the
voting equilibrium.
Lemma 11. If there is entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
) and (1
2
, x3), and player
1 is part of the voting equilibrium, an even number of players will enter in
both intervals.
Proof. We have seen by Lemma 2 that the number of players entering both
intervals cannot be both odd, as then the number of votes the players get
would have to be both rational and irrational. Now, if one of the numbers
is odd and the other one even, player 1 can be interpreted as the first player
of an even number of players entering the interval (x2, x3), which is ruled
out by Lemma 4 as both players on the edge are not part of the voting
equilibrium.
Lemma 12. It is not possible that there is entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
)
and (1
2
, x3), and either player 2 or player 3, but not both, are part of the
voting equilibrium.
Proof. First, let us look at the case that player 3 is part of the voting equilib-
rium. Then players 1 and 2 are not, and therefore by Lemma 4 the number
of players entering in the left interval must be odd. In this case, we know
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by Lemma 2 that the number of votes the players get is rational as the left
interval is of rational length. From this we then know that the number of
players entering in the right interval must be even, because otherwise they
would always get an irrational number of votes, also by Lemma 2.
Now, by Lemma 6, we can check whether the rightmost player in the interval
[x3, 1] gets the correct number of votes. We recall that for this to happen the
condition was ∃ y ∈ N : y = F
d1+d2
for F = 2 + d2 − 2v − 2p. Here we have
that d2 = 2v − d1 = 2v − I + nv = 2v − x3 + 12 + nv by Note 2 and p = 12 . If
we plug this in we get that
y =
nv + 3
2
− x3
2v
, (13)
and we see that y can never be a natural number if x3 is irrational.
If player 1 is part of the voting equilibrium, we use the same method and get
that the number of votes must be irrational as an odd number of players must
enter in the right interval, and an even number of players must enter in the
left interval. We then get for the condition that d2 = (n+ 2)v − 12 + x2, and
p = 1
2
. Then we get that the condition is fulfilled if y =
3
2
−x2+nv
2v
, which can
only be a natural number (if x2 is rational) if x2 =
3
2
, which is not possible.
So far we have assumed that x3 is irrational and x2 is rational. We can also
assume it the other way around and choose ε in such a way that it is irra-
tional and such that x3 is rational, and if we then take x2 = x3, the proof
still holds.
Lemma 13. It is not possible that there is entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
) and
(1
2
, x3), and both player 2 and player 3 are part of the voting equilibrium.
Proof. In this case the condition from Lemma 6 has to hold twice, once for
the left side and once for the right side. To recall, the condition is that
∃ y ∈ N : y = F
d1+d2
for F = 2 + d2 − 2v − 2p.
Right side: Here we have that p = 1
2
, d2 = (m + 2)v − I by Note 2 and
d1+d2 = 2v. We then get y =
1+mv−I
2v
, where I is the only irrational number,
so for this equation to hold the number of votes v must be irrational.
Left side: p = 1
2
, d2 = −(n + 2)v + I. We get that y = 1−(n+4)v+I2v . We see
that this equation can be fulfilled if v is irrational if I + 1 = 0, which is not
possible. So, from the left side we get that v must be rational, which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 14. It is not possible that there is entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
)
and (1
2
, x3), and player 2 or player 3 are part of the voting equilibrium.
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Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 12 and 13, as we know from these
Lemmas that neither both nor one of them can be part of the voting equi-
librium.
6.2 Lemmata for specific values of x3
Lemma 15. If x1 =
1
2
, x2 <
1
2
and x3 = 1 − x2 − ε, where ε is irrational
such that if x2 is rational, x3 is irrational and vice versa, it is not possible
that there is entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
) and (1
2
, x3), and player 1 is part
of the voting equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 11, we know that the number of players entering both
inner intervals is even. If we say that n players enter the interval (x2,
1
2
)
and m players the interval (1
2
, x3), and if w.l.o.g. n > m, we get that ε =
d1 − d2 + s(d1 + d2), where s = n−m2 . Note that here we know the specific
connection between ε, d1 and d2 because we assume a value for x3, unlike
in the Lemmata before, and by this assumption we know the difference in
length of the two inner intervals.
Now, by Note 2, we know that in such an interval with an even number
of players entering, d1 = I − Nv and d2 = (N + 2)v − I, where N is the
number of players entering that interval. So, from this we can calculate that
ε = 2I − (2N + 2)v + n−m
2
v. If we express this in terms of v, we get that
v = 2I−ε
2N+2+n−m .
Then, by Lemma 2, as the interval (x2, x3) is entered by an odd number of
players, we know that the number of votes they get is v = 1−2x2−ε
n+m+2
. Now,
if we look at the interval (1
2
, x3), we can check whether the two values for v
coincide for any ε. We get that they do if
2(1
2
− x2 − ε)− ε
2m+ 2 + n−m
2
=
1− 2x2 − ε
n+m+ 2
. (14)
If we express this in terms of ε, we get that
ε =
(1− 2x2)(n+m+ 2)− (1− 2x2)(3m2 + n2 + 2)
4 + 5n
2
+ 3m
2
, (15)
which is clearly a contradiction to the fact that ε is an irrational number if
x2 is rational.
If x2 is irrational, we can do the same thing by reflecting the game along the
point 1
2
. Then x3 is rational and x2 is irrational with x2 = 1 − x3 + ε, and
the above equation then holds for x2 = x3 because x3 is rational.
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Lemma 16. If x1 =
1
2
, x2 <
1
2
and x3 =
3
4
+ x2
2
−ε, where ε is irrational such
that if x2 is rational, x3 is irrational and vice versa, it is not possible that
there is entry in both intervals {(x2, 12) and (12 , x3)}, and player 1 is part of
the voting equilibrium.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the one before. By Lemma 11, we know
that the number of players entering both intervals is even. If we say that
n players enter the interval (x2,
1
2
) and m players the interval (1
2
, x3), and if
w.l.o.g. n > m, we get that ε = d1 − d2 + s(d1 + d2) − 14 + 3x22 . Now, by
Note 2, we know that in such an interval with an even number of players
entering, d1 = I − Nv and d2 = (N + 2)v − I, where N is the number of
players entering that interval. So, from this we can calculate by plugging in
that ε = 2I − (2N + 2)v+ n−m
2
v− 1
4
+ 3x2
2
, as s = n−m
2
. If we express this in
terms of v, we get that v =
2I−ε− 1
4
+
3x2
2
2N+2+n−m
2
.
Then, by Lemma 2, as the interval (x2, x3) is entered by an odd number of
players, we know that the number of votes they get is v = I
n+m+2
=
3
4
−x2
2
−ε
n+m+2
.
Now, if we look at the interval (1
2
, x3), we can check whether the two values
for v coincide for any ε. We get that they do if
2(1
4
+ x2
2
− ε)− ε− 1
4
+ 3x2
2
2m+ 2 + n−m
2
=
3
4
− x2
2
− ε
n+m+ 2
. (16)
If we express this in terms of ε, we get that
ε = −(
3
4
− x2
2
)(3m
2
+ n
2
+ 2)− (1
4
+ 7x2
2
)(n+m+ 2)
4 + 5n
2
+ 3m
2
, (17)
which is clearly a contradiction to the fact that ε is an irrational number if
x2 is rational.
If x2 is irrational, we can do the same thing by reflecting the game along the
point 1
2
. Then x3 is rational and x2 is irrational with x2 =
1
2
+ 2x3− 2ε, and
the above equation then holds for x2 = x3 because x3 is rational.
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7 Putting the Lemmata together
In this section we will use the Lemmas presented in Section 6 to prove The-
orem 1.
Theorem 1. If x1 =
1
2
, x2 <
1
2
and x3 = f(x2) − ε, where f is a linear
function and either f(x2) = 1 − x2 or f(x2) = 34 + x22 and if ε is irrational
such that if x2 is rational, x3 is irrational and vice versa, there cannot be
entry in both intervals (x2,
1
2
) and (1
2
, x3).
Proof. In this case, we know from Lemma 10 that at least one of the players
1-3 must be part of the voting equilibrium formed by the new players. From
Lemma 14 we know that it cannot be the players 2 or 3. Now, for our specific
values of x3, we have that player 1 cannot be part of the voting equilibrium
by Lemmas 15 and 16. So, we have found a contradiction in that none of
the players can be part of the equilibrium, but at least one of them has to
be.
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8 Limit to the Maximum Number of Players
In this section and the next, we will prove Lemmas to help in deriving The-
orem 2. Here, we will give an upper bound to the number of players that are
able to enter after player 3.
Throughout this section, we will assume that player 3 plays the strategy
x3 =

1− x2 − ε if x2 > 16 ,
3
4
+ x2
2
− ε if 1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 ,
3
4
+ x2
2
if x2 ≤ 114
according to our Conjecture 2.
8.1 Limit to the Maximum Number of Players if x2 >
1
6
Lemma 17. The maximum number of players that can enter the game after
x1 =
1
2
, 1
6
< x2 <
1
2
, and x3 = 1− x2 − ε for ε small and irrational, is played
is
1
2
+x2+ε
1
4
−x2
2
− ε
2
.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we know that only one of the two intervals {(x2, 12), (12 , x3)}
is entered. Let us have a closer look at the maximum number of players that
can theoretically enter the game after player 3:
First, let us assume w.l.o.g. that the interval entered is the larger of the two,
which is the interval (x2,
1
2
). As then no player enters the interval (1
2
, x3),
player 1 gets a minimum number of votes, namely half of the interval (1
2
, x3).
So, we know that v(x1) >
x3− 12
2
= 1
4
− x2
2
− ε
2
. We also know that the supre-
mum of the votes the players that enter the game after player 3 can get are
all votes except the ones to be gained in interval (1
2
, x3), so if we denote by vn
the number of votes left in the game, vn <
1
2
+ x2 + ε. All n new players can
now get maximally as the supremum vn
n
votes. These vn
n
must be larger than
v(x1), so
vn
n
> 1
4
− x2
2
− ε
2
. If we solve this for n, we get that n <
1
2
+x2+ε
1
4
−x2
2
− ε
2
.
To see a graphical representation of this, see Figure 2. On the x-axis
there is the value of x2, and on the y-axis you see the corresponding number
of additional players that are able to enter the game given the number of
votes that are still available. In the graph we disregard ε as it is small.
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Figure 2: Maximal number of further players for x2 >
1
6
fixed and x3 =
1− x2 − ε.
8.2 Limit to the Maximum Number of Players if 114 <
x2 ≤ 16
Lemma 18. The maximum number of players that can enter the game after
x1 =
1
2
, 1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 , and x3 = 1−x2−ε, for ε small and irrational, is played,
is
3
4
−x2
2
+ε
1
8
+
x2
4
− ε
2
.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we again know that only one of the two intervals
{(x2, 12), (12 , x3)} is entered. Let us again assume w.l.o.g. that the interval
entered is the larger of the two, which is the interval (x2,
1
2
). As then no
player enters the interval (1
2
, x3), player 1 gets a minimum number of votes,
namely half of the interval (1
2
, x3). So, we know that v(x1) >
1
8
+ x2
4
− ε
2
. We
also know that in this case, vn =
3
4
− x2
2
+ ε. All n new players can get a
maximum of vn
n
votes, so vn
n
> 1
8
+ x2
4
− ε
2
. If we solve this for n, we get that
n <
3
4
−x2
2
+ε
1
8
+
x2
4
− ε
2
.
To see a graphical representation of this, see Figure 3. As above, we omit
the ε.
8.3 Results
We see that for values of x2 that are far away from
1
2
, the Lemmas 17 and
18 give a very low bound on the maximum number of additional players;
specifically, if we can form a statement saying that at least 6 more players
are needed to form a voting equilibrium, entry is not possible in the interval
( 1
14
, 1
4
) by this argument. But, as the x2 gets closer to
1
2
, the bound grows
exponentially, making Lemma 17 less effective for values close to 1
2
. We can
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Figure 3: Maximal number of further players for 1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 fixed and
x3 =
3
4
+ x2
2
− ε.
also see this in Table 1.
x2 Max.
0,07 5,01
0,1 4,67
0,16 4,06
0,2 4,66
0,25 6,00
0,3 8,00
0,34 10,50
0,4 18,00
0,42 23,00
0,45 38,00
0,49 198,00
Table 1: Maximal Number of Players that can enter the Game after Player
3.
Still, if we can put a lower bound on the maximum number of players
that can form an equilibrium, we can exclude certain values that x2 can
take. Note that we also did not take into account the votes player 1 gets
from the interval (x2,
1
2
); this will limit the maximum number of additional
players even further.
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9 Minimal Number of Players that can form
a Voting Equilibrium
We will now have a look at the minimal number of players that need to enter
the game such that they can form a voting equilibrium after three players
entered the game as described in Conjecture 2. If we can limit the number of
people that are able to form a voting equilibrium from below, then, by our
considerations before, we can give an interval for x2 that will not be played
by player 2. Because in that case, player 3 then has a strategy he can play
where a maximum of n players can enter, as we have seen before, and if we can
show that one needs at least n+ 1 players to form a voting equilibrium, then
the strategy by player 3 is optimal, and player 2 will not enter the game at all.
In this section, we will give the proof of two Lemmas with the goal to state a
minimum number of players that can form a voting equilibrium, and there-
fore limit the range of positions where x2 can enter.
For the proofs, we will again have a look at the entries in four intervals and la-
bel them I-IV from left to right, namely the intervals [0, x2), (x2,
1
2
), (1
2
, x3), (x3, 1].
The maximum number of attainable votes by all players entering after player
3 are:
v(I) < x2
v(II) <
1
2
− x2
v(III) < x3 − 1
2
v(IV ) < 1− x3
From now on, if a players enter interval I, b players interval II, c players
interval III and d players interval IV, we will write (a, b, c, d).
Lemma 19. After x1 =
1
2
, 1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 and x3 = 34 + x22 − ε, no voting
equilibrium can be found by any number of players.
Proof. Let us first have a look at the maximum number of votes players can
attain if they enter the different intervals:
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v(I) < x2
v(II) <
1
2
− x2
v(III) < x3 − 1
2
=
1
4
+
x2
2
− ε
v(IV ) < 1− x3 = 1
4
− x2
2
+ ε
By Theorem 1, we know that only one of the two inner intervals is entered.
Note that one of the inner intervals is going to be entered for sure, as they
both have the largest number of maximal votes; if intervals II and III were
not entered, then player 1 would get the most votes, no matter how the other
players enter.
Now we assume w.l.o.g. that interval II is entered, as it is the larger of the
two. It has to be entered by at least 2 players: As we have seen in section
5, one player entering in interval II and one player entering in interval IV
cannot form a voting equilibrium, because either player 2 or player 1 will
have more votes. To further reduce number 1’s votes, a player would have
to enter in interval III, which is not possible by assumption, and to reduce
player 2’s votes, a player would have to enter in interval I. But the player
entering interval I cannot match the votes of the player entering interval II.
So, we must have at least (0, 2, 0, 0), that is to say, we know that at least two
players will enter interval II, and at least one other player will enter any of
the other intervals.
(0, 2, 0, 1):
Then, we will assume that the next largest interval that can be entered will
be entered, namely interval IV. Note that normally the next largest interval
would be interval III, but we cannot enter there by Theorem 1. So, we have
that (0, 2, 0, 1). We see that in this case xa = xb =
1
2
−x2
2
+x2 and xc = x3+
ε
2
,
where we denote by players a and b the players entering interval II, and by
player c the player entering interval IV . We get this solution as in interval
IV, roughly half of the votes of interval II can be gained. It is clear that
player 1 gets more votes than these players, as v(x1) =
x3−xa
2
= 1
2
− x2, and
that is the maximum number of votes attainable in interval II.
So, for a voting equilibrium to form, players 1’s votes need to be diminished
further; the only way this is possible is to let more players enter in interval II.
(0, n, 0, 1):
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The n players entering interval II get v(xn) =
( 1
2
−x2)
n+1
votes, and player 1 then
gets v(x1) =
x3− 12
2
+ 1
2(n+1)
(1
2
− x2) votes. After some transformations we get
that the number of votes of the players entering interval II is larger than the
number of votes of player 1 if x2 <
1−n
6+2n
, which is impossible for any n > 0.
So, this case is ruled out for any number of players as player 1 always has
more votes than the players entering after player 3.
Lemma 20. After x1 =
1
2
and 1
6
< x2 <
1
2
, at least six more players are
needed to form a voting equilibrium.
Proof. Here, the maximum number of attainable votes per interval are
v(I) < x2
v(II) <
1
2
− x2
v(III) < x3 − 1
2
=
1
2
− x2 − ε
v(IV ) < 1− x3 = x2 + ε
Interval II is the largest one, so it will be entered by at least one player. As a
similar argument as the one just given, exactly one player cannot enter inter-
val II in a voting equilibrium, as no player in interval I can get his number of
votes, but a player would be needed in interval I to reduce player 2’s votes.
So, we have at least (0, 2, 0, 0).
j
x2
j
x1
j
xa
j
xb
If player a were to enter first, player 1 would have to be part of the voting
equilibrium, but that is not possible as he gets half of the votes of interval
III. So, player b has to enter first. Then player 2 must be part of the voting
equilibrium, and we get that
2v(xa) = xb − x2
2v(xb) =
1
2
− xa
2v(x2) = xa + x2
which has the solution xa =
1
4
− x2
2
. We see that xa < x2 if x2 >
1
6
, which
always holds true, so we need another player to enter in interval I.
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(1, 2, 0, 0):
It is clear that in this case player 3 has too many votes, so one player needs to
enter in interval IV. Note that no player can enter in interval III by Theorem 1
(1, 2, 0, 1):
Here, if we label the players with a− d from left to right, we get the system
of equations
2v(xa) = xa + x2
2v(xb) = xc − x2
2v(x2) = xb − xa
2v(xc) =
1
2
− xb
v(xd) = 1− xd
2
− x3
2
which has the solution {xa = 16− 2x23 , xb = 13− x23 , xc = 16+ 4x23 , xd = 56+ 2x23 + ε2 ,
v = 1
12
+ x2
6
}. We get that v(x3) > v if x2 > −12 − 3ε2 , so this case is also
ruled out because player 3 gets too many votes.
(1, 2, 0, 2):
Here, we get the equations
2v(xa) = xa + x2
2v(xb) = xc − x2
2v(x2) = xb − xa
2v(xc) =
1
2
− xb
2v(xd) = xe − 1 + x2 + ε
2v(xe) = 2− xe − xd
which has the solution {xa = 16− 2x23 , xb = 13− x23 , xc = 16+ 4x23 , xd = 23+ x23 −ε,
xe =
7
6
− 2x2
3
+ ε, v = 1
12
+ x2
6
}. Here, we get that v(x3) > v if 16 − ε > 16 .
So, we see that at least one more player is needed to form a voting equi-
librium.
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10 Putting it all together
In this section, we will prove the second main finding of this thesis, Theorem
2
Theorem 2. After x1 =
1
2
, player 2 will not play an x2 ∈ ( 114 , 14).
Proof. We will differentiate two cases: 1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 and 16 < x2 < 14 .
1
14
< x2 ≤ 16 :
Here player 3 can play the action x3 =
3
4
+ x2
2
−ε, and by Lemma 19 we know
that no voting equilibrium can exist.
1
6
< x2 <
1
4
:
Here player 3 can play the action 1 − x2 − ε to win alone: By Lemma 17
we know that the maximum number n of players entering after player 3 is
1
2
+x2+ε
1
4
−x2
2
− ε
2
= f(x2, ε). If we take the first derivative with respect to x2, we get
that ∂f
∂x2
= 1
2( 1
4
−x2
2
− ε
2
)2
, which is always positive, therefore the function is in-
creasing in x2. Hence, the maximum number of players is largest at x2 =
1
4
.
For x2 =
1
4
− δ, where δ > 0, we get that f(1
4
− δ, ε) = 34−δ+ε1
8
+ δ
2
− ε
2
. We can calcu-
late that this function is lower than 6 if ε < δ. We see that for any positive
δ, we can find an ε such that this inequality is fulfilled, as we can choose our
ε arbitrarily small as long as it is irrational. If δ = 0, the inequality does not
hold, but it holds for an arbitrarily close number to x2 =
1
4
, which is why we
cannot include the position x2 =
1
4
in our Theorem.
Finally, by Lemma 20, we know that we need at least 6 more players to
form a voting equilibrium in this case. As the minimum number is 6, and
the maximum number is smaller than 6, we see that no voting equilibrium
can be found in this case.
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11 Synopsis
In this thesis, we analyze a game that at first glance looks shallow, but as it
turns out, analyzing it requires rather deep arguments. While we were not
able to give a proof about the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, we were
able to give a Conjecture about its existence in section 5, namely Conjecture
1, which says that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is
the action set {x1 = 12 , x2 = NE, . . . , xN = NE}.
There, we also gave Conjecture 2, which, as we have shown, describes a
strategy by player 3 that would give rise to Conjecture 1. Sadly, we are not
able to prove that this strategy is optimal for all actions of player 2, but we
are able to show that it is for some.
We then derive a very useful result in section 7, Theorem 1, by use of the
Lemmas proved in earlier sections where we see that if players enter the game
like in Conjecture 2, players will not enter in both inner intervals.
In section 10 we then calculate, with the help of Lemmas proven in sec-
tions 8 and 9, an interval ( 1
14
, 1
4
), where it is clearly suboptimal for player 2
to enter should player 1 enter at 1
2
; this result is stated in Theorem 2.
The work done in this thesis will hopefully be expanded in the future. Places
to start would of course be completing the proof for Conjecture 2. To do
this, one could try extending the lower bound necessary in Lemma 20, as
this would expand Theorem 2 and possibly complete the proof. Then, one
could continue by dropping the assumption about uniqueness of the player’s
positions, as this would be helpful in generalizing the results found here.
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Abstract 
In this Thesis, we extend “Hotelling's Electoral Competition Game” to fit a political framework. 
We assume a sequential choice of postition by the players, who represent candidates in an 
election, an exit choice, and an incumbent effect – that is, only one player can adopt a specific 
policy on the policy spectrum. We then find that the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in this 
game seems to be consistent with many findings in politics nowadays and in the past, for 
example Duverger’s Law or results for the behavior of candidates in the US primary elections. 
A conjecture exists about the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in this game for N players, and 
two Theorems concerning this conjecture were formulated and proven in this Thesis. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In dieser Arbeit betrachten wir das Modell, das Harold Hotelling in seinem Artikel „Stability in 
Competition“ beschrieben hat, in einem politischen Zusammenhang. Wir nehmen an, dass die 
Spieler sequentiell ihre Positionen wählen, wobei die Spieler Kandidaten in einer Wahl 
darstellen. Weiters nehmen wir an, dass es eine Möglichkeit gibt, gar keine Position 
einzunehmen, und außerdem einen sogenannten „incumbent effect“, der besagt, dass nur der 
erste Spieler, der eine bestimmte Position einnimmt, Stimmen von den Wählern bekommen 
kann. Dann ergeben sich Parallelen zu politischen Ergebnissen, zum Beispiel das Gesetz von 
Duverger oder das Verhalten der Kandidaten bei den US primary elections. Es existiert eine 
Vermutung über das teilspielperfekte Gleichgewicht in diesem Spiel für N Spieler, und in dieser 
Arbeit werden zwei Theoreme bezüglich dieser Vermutung aufgestellt und bewiesen. 
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